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DELLMUTH V. MUTH: CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT

INTRODUCTION

In Dellmuth v.

Muth,1

the Supreme Court held that the text of the

Education for All Handicapped Children Act2 ("EAHCA") did not display unmistakable congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The Court created a bar to parental suits brought in federal courts

against state educational agencies for violating the right of handicapped
children to equal educational opportunities guaranteed by the EAHCA.
Yet in Brown v. Board of Education,3 the Supreme Court called education the most important function of state and local governments and re-

quired provision to all children on equal terms.4 This right to an equal

educational opportunity should apply with equal force to handicapped
children. 5 Congress passed the EAHCA to provide all handicapped children with a free appropriate public education.6 The Act offers federal
funds to states that guarantee an education to all handicapped children
that is appropriate to their needs. 7
To protect the right to an appropriate public education, the EAHCA
grants anyone "aggrieved by the findings and decision"' of a state or
local educational agency the right to bring a civil action in federal court. 9
This provision explicitly empowers courts to "grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate" 10 and has been held to confer "broad
discretion on the court[s]." '
1. 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 13, 1989).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See id. at 493.
5. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192-94 (1982) (citing Mills v. Board
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
6. Free appropriate public education is defined in the Act as
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet
the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982). All fifty states and the District of Columbia now
receive funds under the EAHCA. See Honig v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 592, 597 n.1 (1988).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Burlington School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). In
Burlington, the Court held that retroactive relief in the form of tuition reimbursement
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The EAHCA was passed pursuant to section five of the fourteenth
amendment,1 2 which grants Congress the power to lift the eleventh
amendment's' 3 protection of state sovereign immunity by statute. 14 The
Court, however, has become increasingly reluctant to find that Congress
intended to abrogate state immunity. In Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 5 the Court held that the eleventh amendment precludes Congress from statutorily abrogating state immunity without "making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' 6 Thus,
federal courts must "be certain of Congress' intent before finding that
federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment."' 7 Finally, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Muth Court, emphasized that the
eleventh amendment requires evidence that is "both unequivocal and textual," stating that resort to legislative history to determine congressional
intent is "irrelevant ... unnecessary [and] futile."' 8
Muth resolved a conflict in the courts. Some courts had held that Congress abrogated state immunity in the EAHCA, given the EAHCA's provisions making the state responsible for enforcing the rights of
handicapped children, and Congress' emphasis on the importance of
those rights and guarantees. 19 Other courts, however, held that the elevwas available under the EAHCA. See id. In this case, however, the sovereign immunity
issue did not arise because the state educational agency ordered the local board to reimburse the parents and the local board appealed to federal court. See id. at 363.
12. See, e.g., Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.) ("we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Congress enacted and amended the [EAHCA]
pursuant to its enforcement powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment"),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988); Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 117, 121
(5th Cir. 1988) ("The [EAHCA] was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); David D. v. Dartmouth
School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 422 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that Congress "act[ed]
under its fourteenth amendment powers"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).
13. The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), the Supreme Court held that the eleventh
amendment also precluded suits against a state by its own citizens in federal court. See
id.; infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
14. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
15. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
16. Id. at 242.
17. Id. at 243.
18. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4722.
19. See, e.g., Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 129-30 (3d Cir.)
(court of appeals affirmed district court award of tuition reimbursement against Pennsylvania), rev'd sub nom. Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 13, 1989);
Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1988) (parents
awarded attorneys fees against state defendants); David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm.,
775 F.2d 411, 421 (1st Cir. 1985) (Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity in the
EAHCA), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986); Michael M. v. Board of Educ., 686 F.
Supp. 995, 1002-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653 F. Supp. 1405,
1419 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 133 (1988).

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
enth amendment precluded suits against the state for retroactive relief
under the EAHCA because the EAHCA does not include a provision
stating that Congress intends to abrogate state sovereign immunity.2 °
This Comment discusses the Muth decision and concludes that its
analysis is flawed. As the Third Circuit demonstrated, Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the EAHCA. Part I introduces the EAHCA and its legislative history. Part II presents the
history and current interpretation of the eleventh amendment. Part III
argues that the EAHCA contains sufficient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity and concludes that the "novel"

canon of statutory construction announced in Muth frustrates congressional intent.2"
I.

THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT

Congress enacted the EAHCA2 2 in response to an increasing awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children.2 3 The states had
failed to meet those needs under the Education of the Handicapped
Act,24 the EAHCA's predecessor. The Subcommittee on the Handi20. See, e.g., Kerr Center Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 842 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
1988) (Congress did not abrogate state immunity in the EAHCA); Gary A. v. New Trier
High School Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d
1258, 1262 -(8th Cir. 1984) (eleventh amendment bars award against state defendants),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); Hiller v. Board of Educ., 687 F. Supp. 735, 745
(N.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion to amend complaint to add claim against state defendants for
retroactive relief and punitive damages denied); Gerasimou v. Ambach, 636 F. Supp.
1504, 1511-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff's claim for transportation costs, witnesses, attorneys' fees and damages against the state Commissioner of Education barred by the
eleventh amendment).
21. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4724 (U.S. June 13, 1989) (Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, dissenting).
22. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The EAHCA, enacted in 1975,
amended the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
23. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprintedin 1975 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1425, 1429. Congress also enacted the EAHCA in response to court decisions that established the right to education for handicapped children. See id. at 1429,
1430-31 (citing Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp.
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("PARC") and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972)).

The PARC court held that the state of Pennsylvania could not deny mentally retarded
children access to public schools, "[h]aving undertaken to provide a free public education
to all of its children." PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1259. Similarly, the Mills court held that
the District of Columbia was required to provide every child of school age free and suitable public education regardless of the degree of impairment. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at
878.
24. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1425, 1431-32; see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180
(1982); Note, LimitationsPeriodfor Actions Brought Under § 1415 of the Educationfor
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 725, 727 n.16 (1988).
The Education of the Handicapped Act authorized grants "to the States and outlying
areas to assist them in initiating, expanding, and improving programs for the education of
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capped of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare found that less
than 50 percent of handicapped children were receiving appropriate education and that over a million children were completely excluded from
public school systems.25 Congress thus passed the EAHCA to "establish
and protect the right to education for all handicapped children and to
provide assistance to the States in carrying
26 out their responsibilities...
to provide equal protection of the laws."
States participating in the EAHCA must submit an application outlining their educational plans and policies to the Secretary of Education.27
The states must identify and evaluate all handicapped children, setting
priorities that guarantee that those children not receiving any education
are served first. 28 The Act requires states to agree to provide full educational opportunities including, whenever possible, placement with children who are not handicapped. 29 The states are also responsible for
allocating the federal funds received to intermediate or local districts and
ensuring that these localities meet the Act's objectives.3 0 If a state finds
that a local district is failing to provide appropriate education to its
handicapped children, it must stop the local district's funding3 1 and provide a free and appropriate education directly to the handicapped child.32
Participating states also prepare individualized educational programs,
which must be reviewed annually in consultation with each child's parents and teachers.3 3 The Act emphasizes that each child's education is to
be at "no cost to the child's parent."3 4 Thus, the state or local agency
must fund special education and related services in private institutions if
handicapped children." H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). The Education of the Handicapped Act also established a Bureau of Education for the Handicapped
and a National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children. In addition, it authorized grants for regional resource centers, higher education programs, and for the establishment of research and development projects, and established a National Center on
Educational Media and Materials for the Handicapped. See id. at 2-3.
25. See 121 Cong. Rec. 19,478, 19,486 (1975). The Subcommittee found that,
although the number of handicapped children served had increased from 38 percent to 50
percent since 1970, only 3.9 out of 8.7 million handicapped children were receiving an
appropriate education and that 1.75 million were not receiving any education. See id.
(remarks of Senator Williams, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare).
26. S.Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1425, 1437.
27. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1413 (1982).
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1982).
29. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1982); see also 121 Cong. Rec. 19,478, 19,483 (1975)
(remarks of Senator Randolph); Note, supra note 24, at 727-28.
30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (1982).
31. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411(c)(4)(A)-(B) and 1413(b)(2)(A) (1982).
32. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1982).
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18-19) (1982). One court characterized this provision as
"requir[ing] the state to treat each child as an individual, a human whose unique qualities
and needs can be evaluated and served only by a plan designed with wisdom, care and
educational expertise." Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. S.Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1425, 1434; see 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
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an appropriate education cannot be obtained in the public system.3 5
Congress established an elaborate administrative procedure for dissatisfied parents or guardians, including a due process hearing before an
impartial officer of the state educational agency, intermediate educational
unit or local educational agency.3 6 Congress also granted parents the
right to seek any relief deemed appropriate by the judge in federal
3 7

court.

The Supreme Court attempted to limit a parent's right to seek relief
3s
for educational discrimination in 1984, holding in Smith v. Robinson
that the EAHCA was the only avenue available for an equal protection
claim to free public education.3 9 Congress reacted quickly, enacting the
Handicapped Children's Protection Act4° ("HCPA") to "reestablish im35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (1982).
36. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). In these hearings the parents have the following rights: the right to examine all records and to obtain an independent evaluation of
their child; prior written notice whenever the local or state educational agency suggests
or refuses to "initiate or change, the identification, evaluation or educational placement of
the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(b)(1)(c) (1982); an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter; the
right to be represented by counsel, present evidence, confront adverse witnesses and to
receive written findings of fact in the due process hearing; and the right to an impartial
appeal. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)-(e)(1) (1982).
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982). Section 1415(e)(2) provides: "Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made.., shall have the right to bring a civil action
with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be
brought in any ... district court of the United States.. . ." Id.
Some cases brought in federal court against a state under section 1415(b)(2) of the
EAHCA arise when a parent, having questioned his child's individualized educational
program and placed his child in a private school, seeks tuition reimbursement. See infra
notes 94-106 and accompanying text (discussing Muth v. Central Bucks School District,
839 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June
13, 1989)). In S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987), for example, parents sought
reimbursement after enrolling their children in a private half-day special education program. See id. at 295-96.
EAHCA actions are also brought to force the state to fund recommended placements.
In Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other grounds,
838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 133 (1988), parents brought suit to require
the state to order and pay for the placement of their daughter, Lara Antkowiak, in a
residential treatment facility. See id. at 1406. The local school district recommended
that Lara be placed in a residential facility and sought approval from the state agency.
See id. at 1408-09. The state refused to approve the placement. See id. at 1409. Meanwhile, Lara was discharged from her earlier placement because her needs could no longer
be met. See id. The approved list of placement facilities contained no other suitable
facilities that could accept Lara and, therefore, her parents placed her in the residential
facility at their own expense. See id. at 1410. The court ordered the state to place Lara at
the requested facility immediately. See id. at 1417. The state was also ordered to reimburse Lara's parents for the tuition expenses they had incurred. See id. at 1419.
38. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
39. See id. at 1013. Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated "Congress will now have to
take the time to revisit the matter. And until it does, the handicapped children of this
country whose difficulties are compounded by discrimination and by other deprivations
of constitutional rights will have to pay the costs." Id. at 1031.
40. Pub. L. No. 372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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portant rights repealed by the Supreme Court [which] .... Congress had
intended to be available to handicapped children."4 1 The HCPA expressly provided for district court jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy, and the award of attorney's fees as part of the costs to the
parent. 4 2 Congress added section 1415(f) to the EAHCA to provide ex-

plicitly that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal statutes
protecting the rights of handicapped children and youth ....
,41 Enforcement of these rights was further enhanced by providing for awards
of attorneys' fees.'
Despite the intention of Congress manifested
through these additional protections, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the eleventh amendment bars retroactive relief when suit is
brought against a state.4 5
II.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The eleventh amendment provides that "the Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi46
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
41. HandicappedChildren'sProtection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1523 Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1986)(remarks of Rep. Williams). The Senate was equally disturbed. Senator
Weicker, submitting the Senate report, stated:
The handicapped children of this country have paid the costs for two years
now. But today we correct this error. In adopting this legislation, we are rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Smith versus Robinson, and reaffirming the original intent of Congress that the educational rights of
handicapped children and their parents shall not go unprotected.
132 Cong. Rec. S9277 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Weicker).
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(A)-(G) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Senator Weicker, co-author of
the amendment, stated: "By restoring this right [to be awarded attorney fees and other
reasonable expenses] we will once again demonstrate that handicapped people should be
accorded the same protections as all other citizens of our Nation." 131 Cong. Rec.
21,390 (1985).
45. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 13, 1989).
46. U.S. Const. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment was enacted to reverse the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), that section two of Article III of the Constitution permitted a citizen of South Carolina to bring
suit against the state of Georgia for debt. See id. at 428. Not only did Chisholm question
the very existence of state sovereign immunity, it left the states liable to suit over revolutionary war debts and confiscation of Tory property. See id. at 452 (Blair, J., concurring); P. Low & J. Jeffries, Federal Courts and the Law of Federal State Relations 773-74
(1987); Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1438 (1975). Suits against South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and
Massachusetts were instituted immediately after the decision's announcement. See P.
Low & J. Jeffries, supra, at 774. Reaction to the Chisholm decision was "swift and hostile." Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987).
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The amendment does not refer to suits brought by citizens against their
own state.4 7 Nevertheless, in Hans v. Louisiana,4 8 the Supreme Court
49
held that such suits were also barred by the eleventh amendment.
Amendments to the Constitution were introduced within days of the decision. See P.
Low & J. Jeffries, supra, at 774; Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than
a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1058 (1983). Georgia enacted a
statute which made enforcement of Chisholm a felony punishable by "death, without the
benefit of clergy, by being hanged." P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra, at 774 (quoting 1 C.
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 99 (1922)); Fletcher, supra, at 1058
(same); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 683
(1976).
Little agreement on the meaning of the eleventh amendment exists beyond the fact that
it overturned Chisholm. Legislative history sheds no light on the eleventh amendment's
meaning because it passed without debate in Congress. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 541
(1978).
47. See U.S. Const. amend XI. The eleventh amendment does not provide immunity
from suits involving all parties. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128
(1965) (the United States may sue a state); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286
(1904) (a state may bring suit against another state); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529 (1890) (a private citizen may bring suit against local government entities); see also
Nowak, supra note 46, at 1414.
48. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
49. See id. at 18-19. The Justices of the Supreme Court are divided as to the meaning
of the amendment. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Trans., 483
U.S. 468 (1987) (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens,
dissenting, disagreed with the interpretation of the eleventh amendment espoused by Justice Powell, joined by Justices O'Connor and White and Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justice
Scalia declining to reach the issue); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985) (four Justices dissenting). In Welch, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and White, took the position that the amendment was intended to establish state sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle: "[It is] firmly
established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad constitutional principle of
sovereign immunity." See Welch, 483 U.S. at 486. This "fundamental principle" acts as
a bar which limits the power of the federal courts to hear any suit brought against states
by private citizens. See id. at 472; see also Fletcher, supra note 46, at 1033-34. According
to this view, the eleventh amendment made explicit a concept of state sovereign immunity
implicit in Article III. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 479 (citing Justice Marshall's concurring
opinion in Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)).
The dissent believed that the amendment only bars diversity suits brought against a
state by citizens of another state or by aliens. See id. at 497. (Brennan, J., joined by
Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting). Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
therefore, should not be interpreted to bar suits based on federal question jurisdiction.
See Welch, 483 U.S. at 519-521 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professors Field and Fletcher
also accept the diversity interpretation-that Congress intended to remedy the Court's
misreading of section two of article III as abrogating common law state sovereign immunity in diversity cases. See Field, supra note 46, at 538-39; Fletcher, supra note 46, at
1035.
Professors Low and Jeffries suggest a third view: the Federalism/Separation of Powers
Interpretation. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 46, at 779. Advocates of this interpretation believe that the eleventh amendment only limits the law-making power of the
federal courts: "Nothing in the language or the history of the eleventh amendment suggests that it must be construed to limit congressional power.... ." Tribe, supra note 46,
at 693; see also Nowak, supra note 46, at 1440-53. According to Professor Nowak, the
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Exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment

The eleventh amendment, however, is subject to a few exceptions. In
Ex Parte Young,50 the Court held that a suit for prospective injunctive
relief against an official acting in violation of the fourteenth amendment
was not barred by the eleventh amendment." The Court created a fiction in which the defendant's immunity from suit as a state official was
"stripped" by his constitutional violation. 2 This fiction was "necessary
to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state
officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.' ,
In Edelman v. Jordan,54 however, the Court held that the eleventh
amendment barred retroactive relief because the state, and not the state
official, was the real party in interest.5 5 Retroactive relief, an impermissi56
ble raid on state treasuries, was more intrusive than prospective relief.
In a subsequent opinion, PennhurstState School & Hospital v. Halderman,57 the Court stated that the Edelman opinion recognized "that the
need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to
the constitutional immunity of the States."5 8 An extension of Ex Parte
crucial distinction is between Congress' power to create a private cause of action and
judicial power to find an implied one. See Nowak, supra note 46, at 1414. The interpretation is based on the idea that the states surrendered their sovereignty to Congress in
certain areas when they ratified the Constitution. See Tribe, supra note 46, at 684. Article
III "was designed to permit the Congress to use the federal courts for any purpose legitimately within its article I powers." P. Low & J. Jeffiries, supra note 46, at 779; see Nowak, supra note 46, at 1425. The relationship between the states and the federal
government is Congress' concern, and not that of the federal courts because Congress,
and not the courts, is accountable to both the states and the federal government. See P.
Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 46, at 779-80; Tribe, supra note 46, at 694-95, 711; Nowak,
supra note 46, at 1441.
50. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
51. See id.

52. See id. at 159. Justice Peckham, explaining the fiction, stated:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of
the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect
the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.
Id.

53. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (quoting
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).
54. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
55. See id. at 666-67. In Edelman, the court of appeals awarded welfare recipients
retroactive relief in the form of wrongfully withheld benefits under a theory of equitable
restitution. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the retroactive payments were closer to an impermissible monetary award than the equitable relief permissible under Ex Parte Young. See
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666, 678. By limiting Ex Parte Young to less intrusive prospective
relief, the Court hoped to provide a forum to ensure state compliance without raiding the
state treasury by granting retroactive relief. See id. at 666 n. 11, 667-68.
56. See id. at 666-68.
57. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
58. Id. at 105. In Pennhurst, the Court held, inter alia, that the distinction between
retroactive and prospective relief did not apply when suit was brought against state offli-
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Young to permit the retroactive benefits sought by the plaintiffs in
Edelman would "effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States." 59
B.

CongressionalAbrogation of the Eleventh Amendment

The eleventh amendment's bar to recovery of retroactive relief is also
lifted in other circumstances.' In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,6 1 for instance, the
Court held that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting legislation pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. 2
In Bitzer, male employees of Connecticut alleged that changes in the
state's retirement benefit plan discriminated against them on the basis of
their sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 The
Court held that section five, which explicitly granted Congress the authority to enact legislation to enforce the fourteenth amendment, "necessarily limited" the eleventh amendment. 64 The states, by ratifying the
fourteenth amendment, "clearly contemplate[d]" the subsequent limitations on their authority and thus consented to suit for money damages.6 5
A finding that Congress statutorily abrogated state immunity pursuant
cials on the basis of state law because there was no need to balance the supremacy of
federal law with state immunity. Id. at 106.
59. Id. at 105 (describing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
60. For example, a state may consent to suit in federal court, thereby waiving its
sovereign immunity. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985). In Clark, the Court found
that Rhode Island had waived its immunity by voluntarily appearing in federal court.
See Clark, 108 U.S. at 447-48.
A finding that a state consented to suit must be in "the most express language," however, before a court can subject a state to retroactive relief. Murray v. Wilson Distilling
Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). This requirement precludes "constructive" consent to suit
by receipt of federal funds or participation in a federally-regulated area. See Scanlon, 473
U.S. at 246-47.
61. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
62. See id. at 456.
63. See id. at 448 & 448 n.1. Section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970)) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
64. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456. The enforcement clause provides that "Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
65. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 453. The Court stated that the "legislation considered in each
case was grounded on the expansion of Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty-found to be intended by the Framers and made part of the
Constitution upon the States' ratification of those Amendments, a phenomenon aptly de-
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to the fourteenth amendment, however, requires evidence of congressional intent to do so. The standard used by the Bitzer Court was
Edelman's "threshold fact of congressional authorization." 66 Title VII
contained explicit references to the states, thus meeting the necessary
threshold of congressional intent.6 7
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,68 the Court required more
than Edelman's "threshold fact of congressional authorization," 69 holding that Congress must express its intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment in "unmistakable language in the statute itself."70 Scanlon reversed
scribed as a 'carv[ing] out.'" Id. at 455-56 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346
(1880)).
66. Id. at 452 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)). In Edelman,
the Court held that Congress had not intended to abrogate state immunity in the Aid to
the Aged, Blind or Disabled program of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383
(1982). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674 (1974).
The Seventh Circuit had considered Illinois' participation in the funding program to be
a constructive waiver of its sovereign immunity. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985,
995 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see also
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671. The Court, however, held that waiver by participation
"turn[ed] on whether Congress had intended to abrogate the immunity in question."
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672. In the Social Security Act, "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes States [was]
wholly absent." Id.
67. See Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 452, 453 n.9. Congress, when amending Title VII of the
Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to e-17 (1982)), had stricken an express exclusion of states in the definition of
those subject to the Act and added those employed by state and local governments to the
definition of employees. See Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 449 n.2; infra note 139 and accompanying
text.
In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court described Bitzer's holding as establishing Congress' "plenary power to set aside the States' immunity from retroactive relief
in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 693. The Court stated that in
enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90
Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)), "Congress undoubtedly intended
to exercise that power and to authorize fee awards payable by the States." Hutto, 437
U.S. at 693-94. The congressional authorization in Hutto was present because the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act applied to any action enforcing civil rights and was
aimed primarily at the states. See id.
Section 1988 provides in part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
[the Civil Rights Acts], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982).
Justice Powell, dissenting on the eleventh amendment issue, believed that the majority's finding of "authorization" did not satisfy the Edelman test. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at
705 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
advocated "statutory language sufficiently clear to alert every voting Member of Congress
of the constitutional implications of particular legislation." Id. Without this statutory
language, Justice Powell stated, the Court "undermine[d] the values of federalism served
by the Eleventh Amendment by inferring from congressional silence an intent to 'place
new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States.'" Id. (quoting Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973)).
68. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
69. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672.
70. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 243.
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a Ninth Circuit holding7 1 that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
197372 ("Rehabilitation Act") contained the authorization required by
Edelman and Bitzer.73 While recognizing that the eleventh amendment
was necessarily limited by Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment,7 4 the Court stated that section 504 fell "far short of expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity."' 75 Unmistakable language was required to protect the " 'constitutionally mandated balance of power' between the
States and the Federal Government ...

adopted by the Framers to en-

sure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.' "76
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,
dissenting, agreed that if the doctrine was necessary to protect fundamental liberties, it would be "unobjectionable. ' ' 77 Justice Brennan, however, characterized the eleventh amendment doctrine as resting upon
"flawed premises, misguided history, and an untenable vision of the
needs of the federal system it purports to protect."7 Justice Brennan
71. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
234 (1985).
72. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701796 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States... shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
73. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237 (1985). The court of
appeals had held that the states' consent could be inferred from participation in programs
funded under the Rehabilitation Act. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d
359, 361 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). The court of appeals stated that the
Rehabilitation Act, because it provided remedies against "any recipient of Federal assistance," 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1982), had the "threshold fact of congressional authorization"
to sue the states. Scanlon, 735 F.2d at 361 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
672 (1974)).
74. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238.
75. Id. at 247.
76. Id. at 242 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)). A second interest discussed by the Court was the
limited jurisdiction of federal courts. See id. at 243. By holding that Congress intended
to abrogate state immunity, the Court stated, federal courts necessarily expanded their
own jurisdiction. See id.
77. See id. at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 248. Characterizing the doctrine as "pernicious," Justice Brennan stated:
In an era when sovereign immunity has been generally recognized by courts and
legislatures as an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal system, the Court has aggressively expanded its scope. If this doctrine were required to enhance the liberty of our people in accordance with the
Constitution's protections, I could accept it. If the doctrine were required by
the structure of the federal system created by the Framers, I could accept it.
Yet the current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting
the States from the consequences of their illegal conduct. And the decision
obstructs the sound operation of our federal system by limiting the ability of
Congress to take steps it deems necessary and proper to achieve national goals
within its constitutional authority.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
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contended that the majority, in the name of federalism, frustrated clear
congressional intent.7 9
Congress agreed. In 1986, Congress enacted an amendment to the Rehabilitation Act that provides in pertinent part that "[a] state shall not be
immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States for a violation of [the Rehabilitation Act] or provisions of
any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance." 8 ° As Justice Brennan pointed out in his Muth
dissent, this amendment was enacted "because '[t]he Supreme Court's
decision [in Scanlon] misinterpreted congressional intent ....

It would

be inequitable for Section 504 to mandate state compliance with its provisions and yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in Federal
courts when State or State agency actions are in issue."81 In Muth, the
Court has repeated this error.
In Muth, as in Scanlon, the Court emphasized the eleventh amendment's importance to the constitutionally-required balance between the
states and the federal government.82 This balance protects the interests
of federalism and requires the courts to be certain of Congress' intent
before subjecting the states to suit in federal court.83 In Bitzer, the Court
referred to the standard required to protect the interests of federalism as
a "threshold fact of congressional authorization. '8 4 Subsequently, in
Quern v. Jordan,8 5 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198386 did not "explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away
the immunity of the States." 8 7 Finally, in Scanlon, the Court required an
expression of intent "to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself" to protect the interests implicated by
the eleventh amendment.8 8
Scanlon did not set a new standard, but stated it differently, as did the
79. See id. at 252. Justice Brennan stated: "Given the unequivocal legislative history,
the Court's conclusion that Congress did not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity
when it enacted § 504 obviously cannot rest on an analysis of what Congress intended to
do or on what Congress thought it was doing." Id.
80. Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
81. Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4725 (U.S. June 13, 1989) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986)).
82. See Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4721-22; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238-39 (1985).
83. Id. at 243.
84. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 452 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)).
85. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
86. Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)).
87. Quern, 440 U.S. at 345. The Court distinguished Bitzer's finding of threshold
authorization in Title VII. See id. at 344-45. Hutto was also distinguished because of its
legislative" 'history focusing directly on the question of state liability,' "id. at 345 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 698 n.31 (1978)), even though "the statutory language
in Hutto did not separately impose liability on States in so many words." Id. at 344-45.
88. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 243.
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Bitzer and Quern courts. The Court has always required certainty of
congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 9 Writing for
the majority in Scanlon, Justice Powell characterized the abrogation
standard 'as consistent with Quern and Edelman, stressing that the Court
would not temper the requirement of an unequivocal expression of congressional intent. 90 Justice Powell emphasized certainty of congressional
intent, not a more restrictive standard for statutory interpretation. 9 1
The Scanlon Court did not intend to limit the federal courts to the
"four corners of a statute."9 2 As the Seventh Circuit, interpreting Scanlon, stated, "[t]he Court has never held.., that a statute must expressly
provide that it abrogates the states' immunity."9 3 The test, therefore, is
whether the federal courts are certain of Congress' intent, and not
whether the EAHCA includes a provision expressly stating that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity.
III. WHETHER THE EAHCA ABROGATES STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A.

The Muth Decision

In 1983, Alex Muth, a "bright child" with a learning disability asked
to be placed in mainstream classes. 94 Alex had some difficulties, however, and the school district recommended placement in classes for the
handicapped. 9" His father challenged the suggested placement and requested a due process hearing pursuant to section 1415(b)(2),9 6 placing
his son in a private school for the learning disabled. 97 Initially, the hearing officer found that the district's proposed plan was inappropriate.9"
After the district modified its plan, however, the hearing officer decided
in favor of the district and his decision was affirmed by the state Secre89. See id. at 242-43; In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1036
(7th Cir. 1987). In Scanlon, Justice Powell stated: "[I]n determining whether Congress
in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, we have required 'an unequivocal expression of congressional
intent.'" Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 240 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)).
90. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 242.
91. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238-40, 242-43.
92. Note, CongressionalAbrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
1436, 1446 (1986).
93. Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
In Re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 324 (7th Cir. 1987) (the Scanlon test's essence is
the requirement that the "federal courts . . . be certain of Congress' intent" (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (emphasis in original))).
94. See Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd
sub nora. DelImuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 13, 1989).
95. See id.
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
97. See Muth, 839 F.2d at 117.
98. See id. at 118.
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tary of Education.99 Mr. Muth appealed to the district court, naming the
local school district and the Secretary of Education for the State of Pennsylvania as defendants."o
In August 1986, the district court held that Pennsylvania's due process
procedures were inadequate and ordered the district and the Secretary to
reimburse the tuition costs incurred by Mr. Muth because of the delays
caused by the due process flaws.101 In affirming the district court's order,
the Third Circuit noted first that the EAHCA authorized federal courts
to award any appropriate relief 2 and that the Supreme Court had held
that its provisions granted the courts broad, equitable discretion to award
03 The court then turned to the issue whether the
even retroactive relief. 1
eleventh amendment barred such an award against the Secretary of Education." ° The Third Circuit found that the EAHCA and its legislative
history left "no doubt that Congress intended to abrogate the [eleventh]
amendment," 0 5 following other courts that have taken the position that
Congress intended to abrogate state immunity in enacting the
EAHCA.'° 6 In both Muth and David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee,' 0 7 the courts cited the preamble of the EAHCA as unmistakable language: "it is in the national interest that the Federal government assist
State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs
of handicapped children in order to assure equalprotection of the law."'10 8
Other courts, however, had held that the EAHCA did not satisfy the
99. See id.
100. See id. at 116.
101. See id. at 118.
102. See id. at 126 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
103. See id. (quoting Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)).
104. See id. at 128.
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., id. at 129-30; Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 117, 120-21
(5th Cir. 1988) (awarding parents attorneys fees against state defendants); David D. v.
Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 421 (lst Cir. 1985) (stating that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity in the EAHCA), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986);
Michael M. v. Board of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 995, 1002-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (same);
Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653 F. Supp. 1405, 1419 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 133 (1988).
107. 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985).
108. Muth, 839 F.2d at 128 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1982)) (emphasis added);
DavidD., 775 F.2d at 421 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1982)) (emphasis in original).
David D. and Muth also relied on the EAHCA's repeated references to state and local
agencies. See David D., 775 F.2d at 422; Muth, 839 F.2d at 129. The Muth court found
this passage from David D. persuasive:
Under the federal Act and its implementing regulations, the State educational
agency promises to ensure that it and its local educational agencies will provide
at minimum a free appropriate public education .... The culmination of the
state administrative appeals process is the right of any party 'aggrieved' by the
decision or procedure employed to take the matter to either state or federal
court. Obviously, since the state is responsible for guaranteeing that a child will
receive both the substantive and procedural rights set forth in the Act, Congress
intended that the State should be named as an opposing party, ifnot the sole
party, to the proceeding.
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"unmistakable language in the statute"' 109 requirement imposed by ScanIon and thus did not manifest an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.1 10 In Kerr Center Parents Association v. Charles,1 1 the Ninth
Circuit held, without further discussion, that "Congress had not, in the
EAHCA, expressed in unmistakable language its intent to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity pursuant to section [five] of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 1 2 In Gary A. v. New Trier High School District No.
203,113 the Seventh Circuit stressed that congressional abrogation must
be "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' 1 14 The court

found that the EAHCA, like the Rehabilitation Act, included only "'[a]
general authorization for suit in federal court [and that] is not the kind of
unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.' "15
In reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court conceded that "the
[EAHCA's] frequent reference to the States, and its delineation of the
State's important role in securing an appropriate education for handicapped children, make the States ... logical defendants" yet held that
this "permissible inference" was not "the unequivocal declaration" required for congressional abrogation.1 16

B. The Necessity of Retroactive Relief
Under Young and Edelman, suits against a state agency brought by a
parent for prospective relief, such as a change in a child's educational
Muth, 839 F.2d at 129 (quoting David D., 775 F.2d at 422) (citations omitted, emphasis
added)).
109. Atascadero State Hosp. v.Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
110. See, e.g., Kerr Center Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 842 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
1988) (enactment of EAHCA did not abrogate state's eleventh amendment immunity);
Gary A. v. New Trier High School Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Congress did not abrogate state immunity in the EAHCA, therefore state defendants
immunized); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[The]
language [of the EAHCA] simply does not pass muster under the stringent Scanlon
test."), aff'd as modified on a separate issue sub nom. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.
Ct. 592 (1988) (Supreme Court declined to hear abrogation issue); Rose v. Nebraska, 748
F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 1984) (eleventh amendment bars award against state defendants), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); Hiller v. Board of Educ., 687 F. Supp. 735, 745
(N.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying motion to amend complaint to add claim against state defendants for retroactive monetary relief and punitive damages); Gerasimou v. Ambach, 636 F.
Supp. 1504, 1511-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff's claim for transportation costs, witnesses, attorneys fees and damages against state Commissioner of Education barred by
the eleventh amendment).
111. 842 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 1059; see also Maher, 793 F.2d at 1494.
113. 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 944 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
The court, quoting Scanlon, stated: "Noting that 'the Eleventh Amendment implicates
the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal government and the States',
the Court held that Congress may abrogate the states' immunity 'only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the languageof the statute.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
115. Id. (quoting Scanlon).
116. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4723 (U.S. June 13, 1989).
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placement or for provision of additional services, clearly would not violate the eleventh amendment.' 17 Prospective relief, however, is often in18
sufficient to protect a child's right to free and appropriate education.'
The EAHCA's extensive administrative appeals system can lead to years
of delay.' 1 9 These lost years are critical to a child's development. Most
parents, at least those financially able, do not choose to leave their child
in an inadequate and inappropriate situation while waiting for administrative orders.12 Therefore, the opportunity to seek retroactive relief is
necessary to fully protect the rights guaranteed in the EAHCA. In order
to grant retroactive relief, however, courts must find that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity by enacting appropriate legislation pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. 121
C. Requirements for Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
and the EAHCA
The first requirement for a finding of congressional abrogation is evidence that the EAHCA was enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. This determination requires a "discern[ible] . . .
legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that
117. For example, in David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 615 F. Supp. 639 (1984),
aff'd, 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986), the court found
that the local districts' proposed individualized education program was insufficient and
ordered the district to place the child in a more appropriate setting. See id. at 647-48. In
Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ordered Mississippi to provide full-year instruction to handicapped children. See
id. at 1035.
118. See Burlington School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71
(1985). Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, stated:
If the administrative and judicial review under the Act could be completed in a
matter of weeks, rather than years, it would be difficult to imagine a case in
which such prospective injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so
vividly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous.
Id. at 370.
119. In Burlington, the parent initially contested his child's placement in 1979. See id.
at 362. The child and his parents went through several hearings even before the case
went to federal court, where it was reversed and remanded twice. See id. at 366. The
Supreme Court heard the case in 1985, nearly six years later. See id. at 359.
Additional examples include Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 391 (1988) and Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 133 (1988), in which the plaintiffs initiated their suits three years prior to the circuit
cases.
120. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
121. See, e.g., Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.) ("we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Congress enacted and amended the [EAHCA]
pursuant to its enforcement powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment"),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 391 (1988); Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 117, 121
(5th Cir. 1988) ("The [EAHCA] was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); David D. v. Dartmouth
School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 421-22 (Ist Cir. 1985) (concluding that Congress "acted
pursuant to its fourteenth amendment powers"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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power."' 2 2 Discernible legislative intent to invoke the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee is evident in the statute itself. Section
1400(b)(9) expressly states that "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to
meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure
equal protection of the law."' 2 3 As the Court indicated in Scanlon and
reemphasized in Muth, however, evidence that Congress acted under the
fourteenth amendment is not sufficient. Congress must also have intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity unequivocally and
textually. 124
The EAHCA meets Scanlon's unmistakable language requirement.
The Rehabilitation Act, at issue in Scanlon, did not refer specifically to
the states, 125 although states and their subdivisions received a large percentage of federal funds.' 26 Congress aimed the EAHCA, however, directly at the states and their localities, 127 not at "any recipient of federal
28
assistance," the Rehabilitation Act's general authorization for suit.'
Section 1400(b)(8) of the EAHCA provides: "State and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide education for all handicapped children ...."29 Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, Congress made
the states responsible for ensuring that handicapped children receive the
equal educational opportunity they are entitled to under the fourteenth
amendment. 3 This authorization is distinguishable from the Rehabilitation Act's "general authorization," which Scanlon found insufficient to
122. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1982); see Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d
113, 128 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 13,
1989); David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 421 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986); Michael M. v. Board of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 995, 1002-03
(E.D.N.Y. 1988).
124. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4722.
125. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 245-46.
126. See id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)-(c), 1401, 1415 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1982).
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(8) (1982). The legislative history also refers to both state and
local agencies. The Senate Report, discussing state agency findings of fact, states: "Actions may be brought in the district courts of the United States to appeal the determinations of the State educational agency. ..." S. Conf. Rep. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
47, reprintedin 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1501.
130. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1982); S.Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17, 22,
reprintedin 1975 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 1425, 1438, 1441, 1446; Sen. Conf.
Rep. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1425, 1492.
In support of the EAHCA, Senator Williams stated: "[T]hese provisions reinforce the
right to education.., by setting up a process by which State and local educational agencies may be held accountable for providing educational services for all handicapped children." 121 Cong. Rec. 19,492 (1975) (remarks of Senator Williams). The court in David
D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1140 (1986) found that "since the state is responsible for guaranteeing that a child will
receive both the substantive and procedural rights set forth in the Act, Congress intended
that the State should be named as an opposing party, if not the sole party, to the proceed-
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abrogate sovereign immunity.'3 1 The Rehabilitation Act's general authorization probably would not even meet Edelman's "threshold fact of
congressional authorization" test.132 In contrast, the EAHCA's explicit
emphasis on the states and their responsibilities should be sufficient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity. The Muth
Court, however, characterized these obligations placed on the states as
congressional "coy hints." 13' 3
In Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer,134 the Court applied Edelman's "threshold fact
of congressional authorization" standard and found that Title VII abrogated state sovereign immunity.' 35 The terms of the EAHCA, although
arguably subject to a stricter test under Scanlon, 136 contain greater evidence of congressional intent to abrogate than Title VII. 3 7 Title VII
prohibits discriminatory employment practices. 38 The Bitzer court's
finding of congressional intent to abrogate was based on a 1972 amendment that struck an express exclusion of state and local governments in
the definition of employer and added "individuals 'subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental
agency or political sub39
division' " to the definition of employees.'
While Title VII is aimed generally at "employers,""' the EAHCA is
aimed solely at states and their subdivisions.14 ' For example, the provision of procedural safeguards established by Congress in the EAHCA is
the sole responsibility of "[a]ny State educational agency, any local educational agency, and any intermediate educational unit" receiving assistance under the Act. 4 2 Federal courts should be permitted to hold the
states liable for retroactive relief under the EAHCA because of the
EAHCA's more specific aim at the states.
ing." Id. at 422; see also Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653 F. Supp. 1405, 1419 (W.D.N.Y.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 133 (1988).
131. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985).
132. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974).
133. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4722 (U.S. June 13, 1989).
134. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
135. See id. at 452, 456.
136. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
139. See Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 448-49, 449 n.2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), § 2000e(f)
(1970 Supp. IV) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1982)); supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
141. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1401, 1415 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1982). Section 1415(a) provides: "Any State educational
agency, any local agency, and any intermediate educational unit which receives assistance
under this subchapter shall establish and maintain procedures ... to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards
with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education by such agencies and
units." Id.
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D.

The Importance of Legislative History in Determining
CongressionalIntent

The function of the courts is to "construe the language [of a statute] so
as to give effect to the intent of Congress." '43 In Muth, however, the
Supreme Court held that the Scanlon test restricts a court's analysis to
the language of the statute. 1" Yet Scanlon's emphasis on certainty of
congressional intent supports, not restricts, the traditional approach to
statutory interpretation, which includes an examination of legislative history. As Justice Brennan pointed out, the rule of statutory construction
announced by the Muth majority is a novel one.' 4 5
In the past, the Supreme Court cautioned against plain meaning when
46
such an interpretation would be contrary to the legislation's policy.'
As one court stated:
If the words of the statute make no reference to a suit against a state, it
is highly unlikely that we can be "certain" that Congress intended to
create such a cause of action. However, especially where the statute
expressly provides for a suit against a state, we will not hesitate to
consult the legislative history to resolve any lingering uncertainty. 147

The Scanlon Court did not expressly prohibit references to legislative history. Arguably, the Court did not refer to the Rehabilitation Act's legislative history because the Act's failure to refer to the states was sufficient
evidence of Congress' intent.
The Court has often examined legislative history when considering
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In Bitzer and Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 4 8 later character143. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); see also In
re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987);
Note, supra note 92, at 1448.
144. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4722 (U.S. June 13, 1989). Justice
Kennedy, for the majority, stated:
Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether
Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress' intention is 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,' recourse to legislative
history will be unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear,
recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of
[Scanlon] will not be met.
Id.
145. See id. at 4724, 4725.
146. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543-44 ("When aid to construction of the
...statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use .....
147. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
148. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). The Court held that congressional intent could not be inferred absent "clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away." Id. at
285. In Employees, state employees brought suit to recover overtime pay under section
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1069 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)) ("FLSA"), on the grounds that FLSA reflected
Congress' power to regulate work conditions under the Commerce Clause. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 281.
Section 216(b) provides that "[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of [section 6
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ized by the Court as requiring an express statutory waiver for
abrogation,14 9 the majority looked to legislative history. 5 °
If, as the Scanlon Court suggested, protection of the eleventh amendment is premised on certainty,' 5' then reference to legislative history
should be required.' 5 2 Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education,153 recognizing the importance of certainty of congressional intent, interpreted
Scanlon to permit an inference of abrogation when any other reading of
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act' 54 ("EEOA") would nullify the
statute's express terms. 5 The Seventh Circuit, interpreting the statute,
found that "without the abrogation of sovereign immunity, state agencies
would, in practice, vanish.. ."' The relevant definitions in the EEOA
are nearly identical to their counterparts in the EAHCA.' 57 An examior section 7 of this Act] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the
amount of their unpaid ...compensation. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). The Court
expressed concern that holding states liable under the FLSA would "implicate elevator
operators, janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every office
building in a State's governmental hierarchy." Employees, 411 U.S. at 285. The Court
did indicate, however, that Congress can "place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on
the States" under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 284.
Justice Brennan, however, dissented on the ground that both the FLSA and the Federal Employers' Liability Act were enacted under the Commerce Clause and therefore
the States had "surrendered their sovereignty to that extent when they granted Congress
the power to regulate commerce." Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. See Quern Y.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344 n.16 (1979). Justice Powell, for the Court
in Quern, indicated that legislative history should be considered when looking for congressional intent. See id. at 345. The Court held that there was nothing in the legislative
history to indicate that Congress had abrogated state immunity in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Id.
150. See Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 449 n.2; Employees, 411 U.S. at 283-85.
151. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
152. As Justice Brennan argued, if the Court were "in fact concerned with Congress'
intent it could not have adopted the strict drafting regulations it devises today, ruling out
resort to legislative history and apparently also barring inferential reasoning from text
and structure." See Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4724 (U.S. June 13, 1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
153. 811 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1987).
154. Pub. L. No. 380, 88 Stat. 514 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1982 &
Supp. VI 1986)).
155. See Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1036.
156. See id. at 1037-38.
157. Both 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982) and 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982) are explicitly aimed at
the states. Section 1412(1) of the EAHCA requires that "a State shall demonstrate to the
Secretary that the following conditions are met: (1) The State has in effect a policy that
assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20
U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982). Section 1703 of the EEOA provides that "No State shall deny
equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex,
or national origin . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982).
The EAHCA's and the EEOA's definitions of state educational agencies are identical.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(7) (1982); id. § 3381(k). Section 1401(7) of the EAHCA and section 3381(k) of the EEOA define state educational agencies as "the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public
elementary and secondary schools." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(7), 3381(k) (1982).
The Gomez court went on to distinguish section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act from the
EEOA: "Unlike, for example, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 and 794a, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703(f) and 1706
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nation of the EAHCA's legislative history to support a finding of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity does not offend the basic
principles of federalism encompassed by the eleventh amendment.
E. A Finding of Abrogation Comports with the FundamentalPrinciples
of Federalism
The Scanlon Court feared that subjecting the states to suit would upset
the balance of power between the states and the federal government and
jeopardize "fundamental liberties."15' 8 According to the majority, the
Framers believed that strong state governments were a necessary "counterpoise" to the federal government.' 59 The states ratified the eleventh
amendment6 to preserve this constitutional balance 6 ' and to protect their
treasuries. ' '

The EAHCA was enacted to protect the equally fundamental constitutional principle of equal protection. Allowing a state to invoke sovereign
immunity frustrates that purpose and the federal courts' "primary obligation to protect the rights of the individual that are embodied in the
Federal Constitution."' 6 2 The fourteenth amendment clearly limits the
power of the states.1 63 When Congress acts pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment to enforce equal protection guarantees, the states' interest in
sovereign immunity, including their interests in protecting the public,
must give way. 64 Congress originally attempted to protect the right of
handicapped children to equal educational opportunities by a less intrusive manner in the Education of the Handicapped Act.' 6 5 Yet, under
this earlier act, "handicapped children [remained] 'either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting
do not simply provide relief against a general class of defendants that may or may not
include the states and their agencies." Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1038. Yet six months earlier,
in Gary A. v. New Trier High School District No. 203, 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986), the
Seventh Circuit held that the EAHCA was "similar in all relevant parts" to the Rehabilitation Act. Gary A., 796 F.2d at 944.
158. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (quoting Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
159. See id. at 239 n.2.
160. See id.; supra note 49.
161. See supra note 46.
162. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4669 (U.S. June 13, 1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
163. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1976).
164. See id. at 454. The Court cited Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880):
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and
they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is
empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth,
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no
invasion of State sovereignty.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)). Although
the states still have an interest in the integrity of their treasuries, they are not as vulnerable as they were in 1793, when the states were near collapse because of their crushing
Revolutionary War debts. See supra note 46.
165. See supra note 24.
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the time when they were old enough to 'drop out'.'
"66 This inequity
16 7
required the increased protections of the EAHCA.
Judicial interpretation of congressional action also implicates the constitutional balance between the legislature and the judiciary."' 8 Failure
to give effect to Congress' intent is as dangerous to the Framers' conception of the constitutional plan as undermining sovereign immunity's "vital role."16' 9 Emphasis on certainty of Congress' intent protects the
interests of federalism and the separation of powers.
The clear intent of Congress in enacting the EAHCA was to guarantee
handicapped children the right to free and appropriate public education. 170 Congress made it the states' responsibility to provide an appropriate education at no cost to the child's parent. 171 The view that
Congress did not abrogate sovereign immunity simply because the Act
does not say "we intend to abrogate" plainly conflicts with Congress'
intent in the EAHCA.
CONCLUSION

Congress, in enacting the EAHCA, recognized the important national
166. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)).
167. See id. The EAHCA's Conference Report emphasized that "Congress must take
a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee
that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity. It can no longer
be the policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring all
children to be in school." S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprintedin 1975 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1433.
168. See In Re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 325 (7th Cir.) (citing Note, supra
note 92, at 1448), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 227 (1987).
169. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (quoting Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)). As the Court has recognized, state sovereign immunity should be protected by the procedural safeguards provided by the Constitution, and not by "judicially-created limitations" on the power of the
federal government. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552
(1985). The Garcia Court stated:
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself..., the
composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect
the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a
role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the
Federal Government.
Id. at 550-51.
170. See supra notes 125-142 and accompanying text.
171. See Burlington School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70
(1985). The states' financial responsibility includes placement in private facilities if an
appropriate public placement is unavailable. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
10, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1434.
The Senate Report stated that "if a State or local educational agency has placed or
referred [a] child to a private school or to another school or facility... because the State
or local educational agency did not have an appropriate program for the child, then the
State or local educational agency remains financially responsible for that child's education." See id. at 1456 (emphasis added).
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interest in providing handicapped children with an equal educational opportunity. Prospective injunctive relief under the EAHCA is not a sufficient guarantee of a handicapped child's right to a free appropriate
education. Congress' intent to subject the states to suit in federal court is
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. Holding that the eleventh amendment bars retroactive relief under the EAHCA, the Muth decision frustrates Congress' intent and violates a child's fundamental right
to equal protection of the law. To ensure that all handicapped children
have a free, appropriate public education available to them, Congress intended parents to have a complete remedy.
Susan Pringle

